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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
OT so long ago it was thought that a complainant had aNconstitutional right to a trial de novo on appeal to a court
from an administrative decision affecting his property.' Now it
appears settled that judicial review falling short of a trial de novo
will satisfy the requirements of due process.' What decree of
finality a court should accord to an administrative finding of fact
is a question of great import and difficulty. The Texas Supreme
Court has worked out a "substantial evidence rule," a rule con-
siderably different from the substantial evidence rule applied in
the federal courts. Texas decisions of 1947, involving the Railroad
Commission, the Department of Public Safety and the county court
acting as an administrator are of some help in delineating the
contours of the "substantial evidence rule."
DRILLING PERMIT-SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE AMPLIFIED
After the Trapp case,8 it was the consensus of legal opinion that
the Supreme Court of Texas had greatly narrowed the scope of
judicial review of administrative determinations, particularly
those of the Railroad Commission. In 1947 this narrowed concept
of judicial review was given further explanation in Hawkins v. The
Texas Co.' In this case the Texas Co. petitioned the district court
to cancel a special permit issued to J" C. Hawkins by the Railroad
Commission as an exception under Rule 37. Some evidence was
I Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920) ; Lone Star Gas
Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 299, 153 S. W. (2d) 681 (1941).
2 Railroad Commission v. Rowan Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940) ; Buford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943) ; Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S. W. (2d)
424 (1946).
3 Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex. 323, 198 S. W. (2d) 424 (1946).




presented in the trial in support of the Commission's order issuing
the permit. Nevertheless, the trial court ordered a cancellation of
the permit and enjoined Hawkins from drilling. The Texas Su-
preme Court aflirmed, saying:
"... the application for writ of error filed herein in behalf of the
Commission suggests misunderstanding or uncertainty as to the mean.
ing of the substantial evidence rule and as to the scope of judicial review
in a suit to test the validity of an order of the Commission .... That
application, quoting from the dissenting opinion in the Trapp case...
states in substance that the rule should be and is in the trial of a case
like this, as soon as a single witness testifies to acts which would sustain
the permit, it will become useless for the court to proceed further, for
regardless of the evidence to the contrary, the court will be powerless
to do otherwise than to sustain the permit. The substantial evidence
rule does not mean that."'
The opinion stresses that prior Supreme Court decisions have
emphasized the word "reasonably" in expressing the rule to be
that findings of the Commission will be sustained "if reasonably
supported by substantial evidence." To a layman it would be difi
ficult to comprehend a situation where fact findings are supported
by substantial evidence and at the same time are not "reasonably"
supported by substantial evidence." To a lawyer the emphasis on
the word "reasonably" may serve as a clarifying process.
The case of Hawkins v. Texas Co. is susceptible of the follow.
ing analysis as to the present status of the "substantial evidence
rule" and the scope of judicial review. The court may totally
ignore the opponent's evidence and look only to that of the pro-
ponent to determine whether or not it is substantial. This is a prac-
tical approach, for if this narrowed field of review reveals that
the evidence is not substantial, that puts an end to the case; the
Commission will be reversed and the court is spared of further
and immaterial inquiry. But if the evidence is deemed substan-
tial, further inquiry becomes necessary. This is so because to
uphold the Commission's findings, support not only by substantial
evidence is necessary, but also the support must be "reasonable."
5 Id. at WO.
19481
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This emphatic requirement injects a test of relativity into the
application of the substantial evidence rule. The word "reason-
able" connotes a comparison. Nothing of itself is reasonable. A
thing is reasonable or not only in relation to some other thing or
standard. It is therefore inescapable that the opponent's evidence
be looked into. The court can now appraise the relative weight
of one side as opposed to the other, possibly giving consideration
to the credibility of the witnesses," and come to a rational con-
clusion on the whole record as to whether or not the proponent's
substantial evidence "reasonably" supports the findings of the
Commission.
The court does not purport to substitute its discretion and
opinion for that of the Commission. Clearly, substantial evidence
does not have to preponderate to furnish reasonable support. It is
probable that considerably less than a preponderance of the evi.
dence will mark the point of reasonable support. It is up to the
court to decide just when the evidence has reached or fallen short
of that point.
BEER LICENSE-SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE-No TRIAL
DE Novo ON APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT ORDER
In State v. Peeler' the court was confronted with a case in which
petitioner had been denied a license to sell beer by order of a
county judge sitting in an administrative capacity pursuant to
statutory authority,8 and this action had been reversed by the dis-
trict court after an independent judicial determination of the fact
issues. The court of civil appeals reversed the district court for
not confining its review to an application of the substantial evi-
dence rule and remanded the case with the following comment:
e Whether or not the Supreme Court's opinion in the Hawkins case is broad enough
to permit a court to consider the credibility of witnesses in applying the substantial evi-
dence rule is questionable.
T 200 S. W. (2d) 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
STix. PENAL CoDE (Vernon's, 1925) art. 667.
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"The district judge does not have to select the testimony of one side
with absolute blindness to that introduced by the other.
"The district court may consider the whole record to determine the
'substantial evidence' .
The court also cited with approval the opinion of the late Chief
Justice Alexander in the case of Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil
Co."° with the following statement:
"'The Chief Justice ... re-dedicated to the people the three branches
of government as having separate functions. Said opinion breaks the
stranglehold the bureaus were winding around the Judicial branch of
our Government, the opinion places said bureaus in their proper cate-
gory of serving the pcople and not dictating to them.""
Though the element of "reasonable support" so greatly empha-
sized by the later Hawkins case was not mentioned, the ultimate
effect of the opinion is the same and gives fully as broad a scope
to judicial review in the application of the substantial evidence
rule. It is to be stated that the substantial evidence rule was applied
even though the statute expressly provided that appeal from the
county court to the district court should be a "trial de novo." 2
FREIGHT RATES-SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE-No TRIAL
DE Novo UNDER ARTICLE 6453
In Consolidated Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Railroad Commis.
sion" the petitioner complained that the district court had applied
the substantial evidence rule in deciding an appeal brought under
Article 64531" challenging a Commission order granting the Texas
9 200 S. W. (2d) 874,879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
10 139 Tex. 66,161S. W. (2d) 1022 (1942).
11200 S. W. (2d) 874, 879 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
2 TE,. PENAL CoDE (Vernon's, 1925) art. 666, 1 14.
23 201 S. W. (2d) 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
34 Tx. REv. Cry. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's, 1925) art. 6453 provides: "If any railroad
company or other party at interest be dissatisfied with the decision of any rate, classifica-
tion, rule, charge, order, act or regulation adopted by the Commission, such dissatisfied
company or party may file a petition setting forth the particular cause or causes of objec-
tion to such decision ... in a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County, Te=,
against Paid commission as defendant. Said action shall have precedence over all other
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and New Orleans Railroad Co. authority to apply a special sub-
normal freight rate on sulphuric acid. The district court had sus-
tained the Railroad Commission, and the court of civil appeals
affirmed despite earlier Texas Supreme Court decisions"5 requiring
an independent judicial determination of the fact issues in cases
brought under Article 6453.
The court fully considered a lengthy transcript of evidence and
testimony presented in the commission hearing and concluded that
there was substantial evidence to support the Commission finding
that an independent threat of waterway competition made neces-
sary a sub-normal rate. The court stated that the findings of the
Commission had a reasonable basis in the facts. Thus, in effect,
the court required that the evidence not only be substantial but
that it also reasonably support the Commission findings. Such an
interpretation of the case places it on the same plane as the holding
in the Hawkins case.
DRIvER's LICENSE-SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RULE-No
TRIAL DE Novo UNDER ARTICLE 6687b
A question as to the application of the substantial evidence rule
was before'the court in the case of Department of Public Safety v.
Robertson."' An appeal was taken by the Department from a judg-
ment of the county court ordering it to issue a driver's license. The
Department contended that the county judge should not have made
an independent judicial finding as to the facts but should have
limited the scope of review to an application of the substantial
evidence rule. The statute involved was Article 6687b, Section
31,"7 relating to appeals to the county court from decisions of the
Department of Public Safety. The statute provides that the court
shall set the matter for a hearing, examine into the facts of the
causes on the docket of a different nature, and shall be tried and determined as other
civil causes in said court."
S5 Railroad Commission v. Houston and T. C. Ry., 90 Tex. 340, 38 S. W. 750 (1897);
Railroad Commission v. Weld and Neville, 96 Tex. 394, 73 S. W. 529 (1903).
16 203 S. W. (2d) 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
21TEL REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's, 1925) art. 6687b, 1 31.
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case and determine if petitioner is entitled to a license, that the
trial shall be de novo, and that the licensee shall have the right of
a jury. Notwithstanding these provisions, the appellate court re.
versed and rendered, holding that the judicial review by the county
court should not be a trial de novo. The decision of the Depart-
ment was held to be final and conclusive unless a showing were
made that the Department acted unreasonably or unlawfully or
unless its decision was not based on substantial evidence and was
arbitrary or capricious. In reviewing all the evidence the court
concluded that the Department did not act capriciously or arbi-
trarily. The Department's finding that the applicant's operation
of a motor vehicle would be inimical to the public safety and wel-
fare was held supported by substantial evidence and therefore
conclusive.
As to the contention of the applicant that no appeal from the
county court could be taken because none was provided for in
Article 6687b, the answer was made that appeal would lie under
the general laws of the state."8
C.S.
28 TEX. CONsT. Art. V, 1 816.
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